Commit `e87add187b`

e87add187bb42c62e8b74f6bf65e849dec9fff88

parent: 529773484e

Unsigned

cmc <hello@cleberg.net> · 2026-07-26 17:33 UTC

docs: document framework mappings, close coverage gaps, enforce doc/SQL sync

Add docs/framework-mapping.md explaining, for every GitHub signal, why it is
offered as evidence for each SOC 2 / ISO 27001 control, with plain-language
control meanings and honest fit assessments. Written to be the basis for adding
future frameworks (includes a mapping methodology and checklist).

Close three asymmetric-coverage gaps found during the review:
- migration 0006: secret scanning -> SOC 2 CC6.1 (alongside existing CC6.6)
- migration 0007: Dependabot -> ISO A.8.8, code scanning -> SOC 2 CC7.1,
  secret scanning -> ISO A.5.17

Add scripts/check-mappings.mjs (npm run test:mappings): applies every migration
to an in-memory SQLite DB and diffs control_mappings against the doc's reference
table, so the two can't drift. No dependencies (built-in node:sqlite).

Update the README evidence table to match the new mappings.

Layout: unified · split

README.md +6 −4

	@@ -20,14 +20,16 @@ Read-only — it never modifies your repositories, permissions, or membership.
20	\| Signal \| Evidence for \|	20	\| Signal \| Evidence for \|
21	\| --- \| --- \|	21	\| --- \| --- \|
22	\| Branch protection, repository rulesets \| SOC 2 CC8.1 · ISO 27001 A.8.32 \|	22	\| Branch protection, repository rulesets \| SOC 2 CC8.1 · ISO 27001 A.8.32 \|
23	\| Secret scanning alerts \| SOC 2 CC6.6 \|	23	\| Secret scanning alerts \| SOC 2 CC6.1, CC6.6 · ISO 27001 A.5.17 \|
24	\| Dependabot alerts \| SOC 2 CC7.1, CC7.2 \|	24	\| Dependabot alerts \| SOC 2 CC7.1, CC7.2 · ISO 27001 A.8.8 \|
25	\| Code scanning alerts \| ISO 27001 A.8.28, A.8.29 \|	25	\| Code scanning alerts \| SOC 2 CC7.1 · ISO 27001 A.8.28, A.8.29 \|
26	\| Organization / team membership \| SOC 2 CC6.2, CC6.3 · ISO 27001 A.5.18 \|	26	\| Organization / team membership \| SOC 2 CC6.2, CC6.3 · ISO 27001 A.5.18 \|
27	\| Repository inventory \| ISO 27001 A.5.9 \|	27	\| Repository inventory \| ISO 27001 A.5.9 \|
28		28
29	Mappings live in `migrations/` and are applied as a join at query time, so a	29	Mappings live in `migrations/` and are applied as a join at query time, so a
30	mapping can be corrected without re-ingesting history.	30	mapping can be corrected without re-ingesting history. Every mapping — and the
		31	plain-language rationale for why each signal is evidence for its control — is
		32	documented in [docs/framework-mapping.md](docs/framework-mapping.md).
31		33
32	## How it works	34	## How it works
33		35

docs/framework-mapping.md added +600

@@ -0,0 +1,600 @@
	1	# Framework Mapping
	2
	3	This document is the rationale behind every control mapping in gh-attest: what
	4	each GitHub signal is, which compliance control it is offered as evidence for,
	5	and why that mapping is defensible to an auditor. It also explains what each
	6	control code (`A.8.32`, `CC8.1`, …) actually means in plain language, and how to
	7	add a new framework.
	8
	9	It is the human-readable companion to the machine-readable mappings in
	10	[`migrations/`](../migrations). The two must agree — see
	11	[Keeping this document in sync](#keeping-this-document-in-sync).
	12
	13	> Scope of the claim. gh-attest produces evidence, not a compliance
	14	> verdict. A "positive" row means a GitHub setting is in a state that supports a
	15	> control; it does not mean the control is satisfied — that judgment belongs to
	16	> the organization and its auditor. This document explains why each signal is
	17	> relevant to a control, and is honest about where a mapping is a strong fit
	18	> versus a defensible-but-debatable one.
	19
	20	---
	21
	22	## Contents
	23
	24	- [How mapping works mechanically](#how-mapping-works-mechanically)
	25	- [The frameworks in one paragraph each](#the-frameworks-in-one-paragraph-each)
	26	- [The signals and their mappings](#the-signals-and-their-mappings)
	27	- [Branch protection & repository rulesets](#1-branch-protection--repository-rulesets)
	28	- [Dependabot alerts](#2-dependabot-alerts)
	29	- [Code scanning alerts](#3-code-scanning-alerts)
	30	- [Secret scanning alerts](#4-secret-scanning-alerts)
	31	- [Membership changes (webhook trail)](#5-membership-changes-webhook-trail)
	32	- [Membership & team inventory (polled)](#6-membership--team-inventory-polled)
	33	- [Repository inventory](#7-repository-inventory)
	34	- [Complete mapping reference](#complete-mapping-reference)
	35	- [Adding a new framework](#adding-a-new-framework)
	36	- [Keeping this document in sync](#keeping-this-document-in-sync)
	37	- [Sources](#sources)
	38
	39	---
	40
	41	## How mapping works mechanically
	42
	43	Understanding the evidence output requires understanding four rules in the
	44	mapping engine. All four live in [`control_mappings`](../migrations/0002_control_mappings.sql)
	45	and [`buildEvidenceRows`](../src/exporter.ts).
	46
	47	**1. A snapshot is a `(resource, status)` pair; a mapping is a row that attaches
	48	a control to one.** The poller and webhook handler both normalize GitHub events
	49	into a small vocabulary — `resource` (e.g. `branch_protection`, `dependabot_alert`)
	50	and `status` (e.g. `enabled`, `open`, `fixed`). See [`extractFact`](../src/webhook.ts)
	51	and [`poller.ts`](../src/poller.ts). Mapping happens as a join at export time,
	52	never at ingest, so a mapping can be corrected without re-ingesting history.
	53
	54	*2. `status = NULL` in a mapping matches any* status for that resource.** The
	55	join condition is `cm.status IS NULL OR cm.status = l.status`. This is how a
	56	"the tooling exists and is producing signal" fact is expressed independently of
	57	any individual finding's state.
	58
	59	3. Consequently, one snapshot can emit multiple evidence rows. A single
	60	Dependabot alert with `status = 'open'` matches both the `NULL` mapping
	61	(CC7.1, "detection tooling is active", positive) and the `'open'` mapping
	62	(CC7.2, "unremediated vulnerability", negative). This is intentional: the
	63	existence of the scanner and the existence of an open finding are two different
	64	facts about two different control expectations. This behavior is called out
	65	per-signal below wherever it applies.
	66
	67	4. `posture` is the auditor-facing verdict on a row, one of:
	68
	69	\| Posture \| Meaning \| Example \|
	70	\| --- \| --- \| --- \|
	71	\| `positive` \| State supports the control \| Branch protection enabled \|
	72	\| `negative` \| State is a gap against the control \| Branch protection disabled; open secret \|
	73	\| `informational` \| Neither pass nor fail — an audit-trail / inventory fact \| A member was added; a repo exists \|
	74
	75	Two more rules affect which snapshots become evidence at all:
	76
	77	- Unmapped states produce no evidence, in either direction. A
	78	`branch_protection` status of `unavailable` (GitHub returned 403 — the feature
	79	isn't on the repo's plan; see [`fetchBranchProtection`](../src/poller.ts)) has
	80	no mapping row, so it never counts as a pass or a fail. Same for raw
	81	`push` events.
	82	- "Latest row wins" per `(repo, subject, resource)` gives point-in-time
	83	current posture from an append-only table. Access facts are special-cased so a
	84	member who lost access stops being attested — only the most recent poll batch
	85	counts. See the CTE in [`buildEvidenceRows`](../src/exporter.ts).
	86
	87	---
	88
	89	## The frameworks in one paragraph each
	90
	91	SOC 2 is an attestation report defined by the AICPA's *Trust Services
	92	Criteria* (TSC). The criteria we map to are all in the Common Criteria (CC)
	93	series, which every SOC 2 report shares regardless of which trust categories are
	94	in scope. A code like `CC8.1` reads as *Common Criteria, category 8 (Change
	95	Management), criterion 1. The CC categories used here: CC6* — logical &
	96	physical access; CC7 — system operations (detection & monitoring); CC8 —
	97	change management.
	98
	99	ISO/IEC 27001:2022 is a certifiable ISMS standard. Its Annex A lists 93
	100	controls grouped into four themes: A.5 organizational (37), A.6 people
	101	(8), A.7 physical (14), A.8 technological (34). A code like `A.8.32`
	102	reads as Annex A, theme 8 (Technological), control 32. Note this is the
	103	2022 numbering — the 2013 edition used different numbers, so a mapping must
	104	state which edition it targets.
	105
	106	---
	107
	108	## The signals and their mappings
	109
	110	Each section below states: what GitHub thing we read and how, the `(resource,
	111	status)` vocabulary we normalize it to, the control(s) we map it to with a
	112	plain-language explanation, the evidentiary argument, and an honest fit
	113	assessment.
	114
	115	### 1. Branch protection & repository rulesets
	116
	117	What we collect. For each repo's default branch, whether merge controls are
	118	in force — via the `branch_protection_rule` and `repository_ruleset` webhooks
	119	(change events) and an hourly poll of the branch-protection and rulesets APIs
	120	(baseline, for protection that predates the install). Normalized to
	121	`resource ∈ {branch_protection, repository_ruleset}`, `status ∈ {enabled,
	122	disabled}`. A ruleset in `evaluate` (monitor-only) mode counts as not
	123	enabled because it does not actually block anything — see
	124	[`fetchRulesets`](../src/poller.ts).
	125
	126	Maps to:
	127
	128	\| Framework \| Control \| Title / plain meaning \|
	129	\| --- \| --- \| --- \|
	130	\| SOC 2 \| CC8.1 \| Change management. Changes to software/infrastructure must go through an authorized, controlled process — designed, tested, approved, and implemented — and unauthorized changes must be prevented. \|
	131	\| ISO 27001 \| A.8.32 \| Change management. Changes to information systems must follow formal change-management procedures to prevent unauthorized or destabilizing changes. \|
	132
	133	Why this holds. Branch protection / rulesets are the technical enforcement of
	134	change control in a Git workflow: requiring pull-request review before merge,
	135	blocking direct pushes to the default branch, and requiring status checks to
	136	pass. That is exactly the "controlled process… stops unauthorized changes"
	137	language of both controls. Enabled → positive; disabled → negative
	138	("direct pushes now possible" is a concrete change-control gap).
	139
	140	Fit assessment: strong. This is the least ambiguous mapping in the system —
	141	both frameworks name "change management" explicitly, and branch protection is
	142	the canonical GitHub-native implementation of it. The one nuance an auditor will
	143	probe is scope: we check the default branch only, and "enabled" does not
	144	verify that the specific rules (required reviewers, etc.) match the
	145	organization's policy. The evidence attests that a change-control gate exists,
	146	not that its configuration is sufficient.
	147
	148	### 2. Dependabot alerts
	149
	150	What we collect. `dependabot_alert` webhook events — known-vulnerability
	151	alerts against the repo's dependencies. `status` is the alert state: `open`,
	152	`fixed`, `dismissed`, `auto_dismissed`.
	153
	154	Maps to:
	155
	156	\| Framework \| Control \| When \| Posture \|
	157	\| --- \| --- \| --- \| --- \|
	158	\| SOC 2 \| CC7.1 \| any alert (`status = NULL`) \| positive — "detection tooling is active" \|
	159	\| SOC 2 \| CC7.2 \| `open` \| negative — "unremediated known vulnerability" \|
	160	\| SOC 2 \| CC7.2 \| `fixed` / `dismissed` / `auto_dismissed` \| positive — "remediated" \|
	161	\| ISO 27001 \| A.8.8 \| any alert (`status = NULL`) \| positive — "technical vulnerability management active" \|
	162	\| ISO 27001 \| A.8.8 \| `open` \| negative — "unremediated known vulnerability" \|
	163	\| ISO 27001 \| A.8.8 \| `fixed` / `dismissed` / `auto_dismissed` \| positive — "remediated" \|
	164
	165	Control meanings.
	166	- CC7.1 — Detection & monitoring. The entity uses detection procedures to
	167	identify configuration changes that introduce new vulnerabilities, and
	168	susceptibilities to newly discovered vulnerabilities. Dependabot is a
	169	textbook example: it continuously matches your dependency tree against newly
	170	published CVEs.
	171	- CC7.2 — Anomaly monitoring. The entity monitors system components for
	172	anomalies and analyzes them to determine whether they are security events.
	173	- A.8.8 — Management of technical vulnerabilities. Information about
	174	technical vulnerabilities must be obtained, exposure evaluated, and
	175	appropriate measures taken. This is a single control spanning the whole
	176	vulnerability lifecycle — detect, evaluate, remediate.
	177
	178	Why this holds. The presence of Dependabot alerts proves the detection
	179	capability required by CC7.1 exists and is running — hence the `NULL` mapping
	180	fires positive on any alert regardless of state. Each individual alert's
	181	lifecycle (open vs. remediated) is then evidence for CC7.2: an open alert is an
	182	unresolved condition, a fixed/dismissed one is a closed one. On the ISO side
	183	the entire story lands on a single control, A.8.8, because A.8.8 explicitly
	184	covers the full lifecycle — so every status maps to A.8.8 (open → negative,
	185	remediated → positive, tooling-active → positive). See
	186	[migration 0007](../migrations/0007_close_coverage_gaps.sql).
	187
	188	**Fit assessment: CC7.1 strong; CC7.2 defensible but the weakest link in the
	189	system.** CC7.2's formal text is about anomalies "indicative of malicious acts,
	190	natural disasters, and errors" — i.e. runtime security events. An unpatched
	191	dependency is a known vulnerability, which sits more naturally in CC7.1's
	192	"susceptibility to newly discovered vulnerabilities" language than in CC7.2's
	193	anomaly-detection language. Many auditors keep the entire dependency story
	194	(detection and remediation tracking) under CC7.1. Recommendation: before
	195	you present this to an auditor, decide whether open/remediated Dependabot state
	196	belongs under CC7.1 or CC7.2 in your control narrative, and align the mapping to
	197	that decision. Both are defensible; the current split is a design choice, not a
	198	requirement. The ISO A.8.8 mapping, by contrast, is a strong, clean fit —
	199	A.8.8 is purpose-built for technical-vulnerability management and absorbs the
	200	whole lifecycle without the CC7.1/CC7.2 ambiguity. It was added in migration 0007
	201	to close a gap: before it, Dependabot produced no evidence at all in an ISO
	202	export.
	203
	204	### 3. Code scanning alerts
	205
	206	What we collect. `code_scanning_alert` webhook events — SAST findings from
	207	CodeQL or a third-party analyzer. `status ∈ {open, fixed, dismissed}`.
	208
	209	Maps to:
	210
	211	\| Framework \| Control \| When \| Posture \|
	212	\| --- \| --- \| --- \| --- \|
	213	\| ISO 27001 \| A.8.29 \| any alert (`status = NULL`) \| positive — "security testing in development is active" \|
	214	\| ISO 27001 \| A.8.28 \| `open` \| negative — "unremediated finding" \|
	215	\| ISO 27001 \| A.8.28 \| `fixed` / `dismissed` \| positive — "remediated" \|
	216	\| SOC 2 \| CC7.1 \| any alert (`status = NULL`) \| positive — "detection tooling is active" \|
	217
	218	Control meanings.
	219	- A.8.29 — Security testing in development and acceptance. Security testing
	220	processes must be defined and run within the development lifecycle so
	221	vulnerabilities are found before production. The existence of code scanning
	222	is that testing process.
	223	- A.8.28 — Secure coding. Secure coding principles must be applied during
	224	development. An open finding is evidence of a secure-coding gap in the source;
	225	a remediated one is evidence the gap was closed.
	226	- CC7.1 — Detection & monitoring. (Same control as Dependabot's SOC 2
	227	mapping.) Code scanning is detection tooling that surfaces vulnerabilities, so
	228	its presence satisfies the "detection procedures exist and run" expectation.
	229
	230	Why this holds. On the ISO side this splits cleanly across two controls
	231	that map to two facts: "a testing process exists" (A.8.29, from the `NULL`
	232	mapping) versus "the code itself is/ isn't secure" (A.8.28, from each finding's
	233	state). On the SOC 2 side (added in [migration 0007](../migrations/0007_close_coverage_gaps.sql))
	234	only the tooling-active fact is mapped, to CC7.1 — mirroring how Dependabot's
	235	tooling-active fact maps to CC7.1.
	236
	237	Fit assessment: strong on ISO; SOC 2 intentionally partial. The
	238	A.8.29-vs-A.8.28 split is clean — one control is about having the testing
	239	process, the other about the code quality it reveals — and both titles match
	240	the signal directly. The new SOC 2 CC7.1 mapping covers only detection-active,
	241	not finding-level state: code-scanning `open`/`fixed` rows are deliberately
	242	not routed to CC7.2, because whether the vulnerability lifecycle belongs under
	243	CC7.1 or CC7.2 is still an open decision (see the Dependabot fit assessment). Once
	244	that is settled, finding-level SOC 2 rows for code scanning can be added to match
	245	Dependabot. Until then a SOC 2 export shows code scanning as "detection active"
	246	only — which under-claims rather than over-claims, the safe direction.
	247
	248	### 4. Secret scanning alerts
	249
	250	What we collect. `secret_scanning_alert` webhook events — detected
	251	credentials/tokens committed to the repo. `status ∈ {open, resolved}`.
	252
	253	Maps to:
	254
	255	\| Framework \| Control \| When \| Posture \|
	256	\| --- \| --- \| --- \| --- \|
	257	\| SOC 2 \| CC6.6 \| any alert (`status = NULL`) \| positive — "leaked-credential detection is active" \|
	258	\| SOC 2 \| CC6.6 \| `open` \| negative — "live credential exposure" \|
	259	\| SOC 2 \| CC6.6 \| `resolved` \| positive — "exposure remediated" \|
	260	\| SOC 2 \| CC6.1 \| any alert (`status = NULL`) \| positive — "logical-access credential protection active" \|
	261	\| SOC 2 \| CC6.1 \| `open` \| negative — "exposed credential undermines logical access controls" \|
	262	\| SOC 2 \| CC6.1 \| `resolved` \| positive — "logical access control restored" \|
	263	\| ISO 27001 \| A.5.17 \| any alert (`status = NULL`) \| positive — "authentication-information protection active" \|
	264	\| ISO 27001 \| A.5.17 \| `open` \| negative — "exposed authentication information" \|
	265	\| ISO 27001 \| A.5.17 \| `resolved` \| positive — "exposure remediated" \|
	266
	267	Control meanings.
	268	- CC6.6 — Protection against external threats. The entity implements
	269	logical-access security measures to protect against threats from outside
	270	its system boundaries.
	271	- CC6.1 — Logical access controls over protected assets. The entity
	272	implements logical-access security software, infrastructure, and architectures
	273	over protected information assets to protect them from security events. A
	274	credential is such a control; its exposure is a failure of that control.
	275	- A.5.17 — Authentication information. Allocation and management of
	276	authentication information (passwords, keys, tokens) must be controlled. A
	277	credential committed to a repository is exposed authentication information —
	278	exactly what this control governs.
	279
	280	Why this holds. A committed credential is relevant to all three controls at
	281	once. For CC6.6, it is a direct path for an external attacker to cross the
	282	system boundary. For CC6.1, the credential is itself one of the logical-access
	283	keys the control is meant to safeguard, so a leak is a compromise of the access
	284	controls themselves. For A.5.17, the credential is authentication information
	285	whose confidentiality the control requires. In every case: scanning active →
	286	positive (a protective measure exists); open alert → negative (a live
	287	gap); resolved → positive (gap closed). See
	288	[migration 0006](../migrations/0006_secret_scanning_cc6_1.sql) (CC6.1) and
	289	[migration 0007](../migrations/0007_close_coverage_gaps.sql) (A.5.17).
	290
	291	Fit assessment: all three defensible. CC6.6 is the external-threat framing,
	292	CC6.1 the logical-access framing, A.5.17 the ISO authentication-information
	293	framing (added in migration 0007 to close a gap — before it, secret scanning
	294	produced no ISO evidence). Mapping to all three means the export satisfies
	295	whichever control the organization's narrative uses. A further SOC 2 framing,
	296	CC6.7 (restricting the transmission/movement of information), also touches
	297	this and could be added if an auditor prefers it. Note the multiplicity: one
	298	`open` secret now emits six rows — a positive ("scanner running") and a
	299	negative ("open exposure") under each of CC6.6, CC6.1 (SOC 2 export) and A.5.17
	300	(ISO export). That is intended and reads correctly, but expect the row counts to
	301	scale accordingly.
	302
	303	### 5. Membership changes (webhook trail)
	304
	305	What we collect. `member`, `team`, and `repository` webhook events — the
	306	change events, recording that an access-related mutation happened. Normalized
	307	to `resource ∈ {member_access, team, repository}` with the GitHub action as
	308	status.
	309
	310	Maps to:
	311
	312	\| Framework \| Control \| When \| Posture \|
	313	\| --- \| --- \| --- \| --- \|
	314	\| SOC 2 \| CC6.2 \| `member_access` `added` \| informational — "access grant, logged for review" \|
	315	\| SOC 2 \| CC6.3 \| `member_access` `removed` \| positive — "timely access removal" \|
	316	\| SOC 2 \| CC6.3 \| `member_access` `edited` \| informational — "access-level change, logged" \|
	317	\| ISO 27001 \| A.5.18 \| `team` (any) \| informational — "access-rights change, audit trail" \|
	318
	319	Control meanings.
	320	- CC6.2 — Registration & authorization of new users. Before credentials are
	321	issued, new users are registered and authorized; credentials are removed when
	322	access is no longer authorized. A member being added is the provisioning
	323	event this criterion governs.
	324	- CC6.3 — Authorize / modify / remove access. Access is authorized,
	325	modified, or removed based on roles, least privilege, and segregation of
	326	duties. Member removal and role change are the modify/remove events here.
	327	- A.5.18 — Access rights. Access rights are provisioned, reviewed,
	328	modified, and removed per the access-control policy. A team membership change
	329	is an access-rights mutation on that trail.
	330
	331	Why this holds & posture logic. These are the audit trail of access
	332	administration — evidence that grants/changes are captured, which is what an
	333	auditor samples. Most are informational (an add or a role change is neither
	334	inherently good nor bad — it needs human review). The one exception is
	335	`removed` → positive, because timely de-provisioning is itself a control
	336	objective (CC6.3), so a captured removal is affirmative evidence.
	337
	338	Fit assessment: strong on the CC6.2/CC6.3 split (it follows the criteria's
	339	own provisioning-vs-modification language). The informational posture is the
	340	right call — this data feeds the access review, it does not pass/fail on its own.
	341
	342	### 6. Membership & team inventory (polled)
	343
	344	What we collect. The hourly poll writes the full current set of org
	345	members and team members (see [`pollOrgAccess`](../src/poller.ts)), distinct from
	346	the webhook change-trail above. `resource ∈ {org_member, team_member}`,
	347	`status` = the role. Each poll shares one `captured_at` so a batch is a coherent
	348	point-in-time snapshot — this is what powers the [access-review diff](../src/access-review.ts).
	349
	350	Maps to:
	351
	352	\| Framework \| Control \| Resource \| Posture \|
	353	\| --- \| --- \| --- \| --- \|
	354	\| SOC 2 \| CC6.2 \| `org_member` \| informational — "org access inventory, subject to periodic review" \|
	355	\| SOC 2 \| CC6.3 \| `team_member` \| informational — "team-based access inventory" \|
	356	\| ISO 27001 \| A.5.18 \| `org_member`, `team_member` \| informational — "access-rights inventory" \|
	357
	358	Why this holds. A point-in-time roster of who has access is the raw material
	359	of a periodic access review — the recurring auditor ask that CC6.2/CC6.3 and
	360	A.5.18 all expect. Org membership maps to CC6.2 (who is registered/authorized in
	361	the org); team membership maps to CC6.3 (role-/least-privilege-based access).
	362	A.5.18 explicitly names "reviewed" among its verbs, so both feed it. All rows
	363	are informational: an inventory does not pass or fail, it enables the
	364	review.
	365
	366	Fit assessment: strong, with one nuance. The org→CC6.2 / team→CC6.3 split is
	367	reasonable but not the only defensible cut — the review of org membership is
	368	arguably as much CC6.3 (appropriateness of access) as CC6.2 (registration). Since
	369	these are informational inventory rows feeding a review, the exact CC6.2/CC6.3
	370	attribution is low-stakes; A.5.18 is unambiguous. Note the two resource families
	371	(`member_access`/`team` webhook trail vs. `org_member`/`team_member` polled
	372	inventory) are deliberately separate resource names so the change-trail and the
	373	current-state inventory don't collide.
	374
	375	### 7. Repository inventory
	376
	377	What we collect. `repository` webhook events — repos created/deleted/renamed
	378	within the installation. `resource = repository`.
	379
	380	Maps to:
	381
	382	\| Framework \| Control \| Posture \|
	383	\| --- \| --- \| --- \|
	384	\| ISO 27001 \| A.5.9 \| informational — "asset inventory trail" \|
	385
	386	Control meaning.
	387	- A.5.9 — Inventory of information and other associated assets. A complete,
	388	maintained inventory of information assets and their owners must exist.
	389
	390	Why this holds. Repositories are information assets. The trail of repo
	391	create/delete/rename events is evidence that the asset inventory is maintained as
	392	it changes — exactly A.5.9's requirement. Informational: it is inventory, not
	393	a pass/fail condition.
	394
	395	Fit assessment: strong for what it claims. The honest caveat is completeness:
	396	this is a change trail, so it evidences that inventory changes are captured, not
	397	that a full, owner-annotated asset register exists. If a future need is to attest
	398	a complete inventory, the polled repo list (already fetched in
	399	[`listInstallationRepos`](../src/poller.ts)) would be the better source than the
	400	webhook trail.
	401
	402	---
	403
	404	## Complete mapping reference
	405
	406	This table is the authoritative human-readable copy of every row in
	407	[`control_mappings`](../migrations/0002_control_mappings.sql) after all migrations
	408	(0002 seeds most; 0003 replaces branch-protection/ruleset with the
	409	enabled/disabled vocabulary; 0005 adds the polled access inventory; 0006 adds
	410	the secret-scanning CC6.1 rows; 0007 closes the cross-framework coverage gaps —
	411	Dependabot→A.8.8, code scanning→CC7.1, secret scanning→A.5.17). **A "·" in
	412	Status means the mapping's `status` is `NULL` — it matches any status.**
	413
	414	\| Resource \| Status \| Framework \| Control \| Posture \| Rationale \|
	415	\| --- \| --- \| --- \| --- \| --- \| --- \|
	416	\| `branch_protection` \| `enabled` \| SOC 2 \| CC8.1 \| positive \| Change management — review before merge \|
	417	\| `branch_protection` \| `disabled` \| SOC 2 \| CC8.1 \| negative \| Change-control gap — direct pushes possible \|
	418	\| `branch_protection` \| `enabled` \| ISO 27001 \| A.8.32 \| positive \| Change management \|
	419	\| `branch_protection` \| `disabled` \| ISO 27001 \| A.8.32 \| negative \| Change-control gap — direct pushes possible \|
	420	\| `repository_ruleset` \| `enabled` \| SOC 2 \| CC8.1 \| positive \| Change management — review before merge \|
	421	\| `repository_ruleset` \| `disabled` \| SOC 2 \| CC8.1 \| negative \| Change-control gap — direct pushes possible \|
	422	\| `repository_ruleset` \| `enabled` \| ISO 27001 \| A.8.32 \| positive \| Change management \|
	423	\| `repository_ruleset` \| `disabled` \| ISO 27001 \| A.8.32 \| negative \| Change-control gap — direct pushes possible \|
	424	\| `dependabot_alert` \| · \| SOC 2 \| CC7.1 \| positive \| Detection tooling is active \|
	425	\| `dependabot_alert` \| `open` \| SOC 2 \| CC7.2 \| negative \| Unremediated known vulnerability \|
	426	\| `dependabot_alert` \| `fixed` \| SOC 2 \| CC7.2 \| positive \| Remediated \|
	427	\| `dependabot_alert` \| `dismissed` \| SOC 2 \| CC7.2 \| positive \| Remediated (risk accepted) \|
	428	\| `dependabot_alert` \| `auto_dismissed` \| SOC 2 \| CC7.2 \| positive \| Remediated (e.g. dependency removed) \|
	429	\| `dependabot_alert` \| · \| ISO 27001 \| A.8.8 \| positive \| Technical vulnerability management — detection active \|
	430	\| `dependabot_alert` \| `open` \| ISO 27001 \| A.8.8 \| negative \| Unremediated known technical vulnerability \|
	431	\| `dependabot_alert` \| `fixed` \| ISO 27001 \| A.8.8 \| positive \| Vulnerability remediated \|
	432	\| `dependabot_alert` \| `dismissed` \| ISO 27001 \| A.8.8 \| positive \| Vulnerability remediated (risk accepted) \|
	433	\| `dependabot_alert` \| `auto_dismissed` \| ISO 27001 \| A.8.8 \| positive \| Vulnerability remediated (e.g. dependency removed) \|
	434	\| `code_scanning_alert` \| · \| ISO 27001 \| A.8.29 \| positive \| Security testing in development is active \|
	435	\| `code_scanning_alert` \| `open` \| ISO 27001 \| A.8.28 \| negative \| Unremediated finding \|
	436	\| `code_scanning_alert` \| `fixed` \| ISO 27001 \| A.8.28 \| positive \| Remediated \|
	437	\| `code_scanning_alert` \| `dismissed` \| ISO 27001 \| A.8.28 \| positive \| Remediated (risk accepted) \|
	438	\| `code_scanning_alert` \| · \| SOC 2 \| CC7.1 \| positive \| Detection tooling is active (findings unmapped in SOC 2) \|
	439	\| `secret_scanning_alert` \| · \| SOC 2 \| CC6.6 \| positive \| Leaked-credential detection is active \|
	440	\| `secret_scanning_alert` \| `open` \| SOC 2 \| CC6.6 \| negative \| Live credential exposure \|
	441	\| `secret_scanning_alert` \| `resolved` \| SOC 2 \| CC6.6 \| positive \| Exposure remediated \|
	442	\| `secret_scanning_alert` \| · \| SOC 2 \| CC6.1 \| positive \| Logical-access credential protection — detection active \|
	443	\| `secret_scanning_alert` \| `open` \| SOC 2 \| CC6.1 \| negative \| Exposed credential undermines logical access controls \|
	444	\| `secret_scanning_alert` \| `resolved` \| SOC 2 \| CC6.1 \| positive \| Logical access control restored — exposure remediated \|
	445	\| `secret_scanning_alert` \| · \| ISO 27001 \| A.5.17 \| positive \| Authentication-information protection — detection active \|
	446	\| `secret_scanning_alert` \| `open` \| ISO 27001 \| A.5.17 \| negative \| Exposed authentication information \|
	447	\| `secret_scanning_alert` \| `resolved` \| ISO 27001 \| A.5.17 \| positive \| Authentication-information exposure remediated \|
	448	\| `member_access` \| `added` \| SOC 2 \| CC6.2 \| informational \| Access grant — logged for review \|
	449	\| `member_access` \| `removed` \| SOC 2 \| CC6.3 \| positive \| Timely access removal \|
	450	\| `member_access` \| `edited` \| SOC 2 \| CC6.3 \| informational \| Access-level change — logged for review \|
	451	\| `team` \| · \| ISO 27001 \| A.5.18 \| informational \| Access-rights change, audit trail \|
	452	\| `repository` \| · \| ISO 27001 \| A.5.9 \| informational \| Asset inventory trail \|
	453	\| `org_member` \| · \| SOC 2 \| CC6.2 \| informational \| Org access inventory — subject to periodic review \|
	454	\| `org_member` \| · \| ISO 27001 \| A.5.18 \| informational \| Access-rights inventory \|
	455	\| `team_member` \| · \| SOC 2 \| CC6.3 \| informational \| Team-based access inventory \|
	456	\| `team_member` \| · \| ISO 27001 \| A.5.18 \| informational \| Access-rights inventory \|
	457
	458	### Control glossary
	459
	460	\| Code \| Title (plain language) \|
	461	\| --- \| --- \|
	462	\| CC6.1 \| Implement logical-access controls over protected information assets \|
	463	\| CC6.2 \| Register & authorize new users before granting access; remove credentials when access ends \|
	464	\| CC6.3 \| Authorize, modify, and remove access by role, with least privilege and segregation of duties \|
	465	\| CC6.6 \| Protect against threats originating outside the system boundary \|
	466	\| CC7.1 \| Detect configuration changes that introduce vulnerabilities, and susceptibility to newly discovered ones \|
	467	\| CC7.2 \| Monitor components for anomalies and analyze them as potential security events \|
	468	\| CC8.1 \| Put changes through an authorized, controlled process; block unauthorized changes \|
	469	\| A.5.9 \| Maintain an inventory of information and associated assets, with owners \|
	470	\| A.5.17 \| Control the allocation and management of authentication information (passwords, keys, tokens) \|
	471	\| A.5.18 \| Provision, review, modify, and remove access rights per policy \|
	472	\| A.8.8 \| Obtain, evaluate, and act on information about technical vulnerabilities \|
	473	\| A.8.28 \| Apply secure coding principles throughout development \|
	474	\| A.8.29 \| Run security testing within the development and acceptance lifecycle \|
	475	\| A.8.32 \| Subject system changes to formal change-management procedures \|
	476
	477	---
	478
	479	## Adding a new framework
	480
	481	The join engine is framework-agnostic — a new framework is data, not code.
	482	Adding one (e.g. NIST CSF 2.0, PCI DSS 4.0, CIS Controls) is a new migration that
	483	inserts `control_mappings` rows with a new `framework` value, plus a section in
	484	this document. No changes to the poller, exporter query, or webhook handler are
	485	needed. The only code touchpoints are the `Framework` type and the
	486	`normalizeFramework` allow-list — see [What the code needs](#what-the-code-needs).
	487
	488	### Methodology — how to map a signal to a control accurately
	489
	490	Do this per `(resource, status)` you want to attest, and write the reasoning into
	491	this document as you go. The goal the user cares about is 100% defensibility,
	492	so bias toward under-claiming.
	493
	494	1. Start from the signal, not the control. Name exactly what the GitHub state
	495	proves ("a merge gate exists on the default branch"), in one sentence, without
	496	reference to any framework.
	497	2. *Find the control whose intent* that sentence satisfies** — read the actual
	498	control text, not a blog summary. If the signal only partially satisfies the
	499	control, say so in the fit assessment; do not round up.
	500	3. Prefer one strong control over several weak ones. A single defensible
	501	mapping is worth more to an auditor than three tenuous ones. Tenuous mappings
	502	erode trust in the whole evidence pack.
	503	4. Assign posture from the control's expectation, not the signal's sentiment:
	504	- `positive` — the state is what the control wants.
	505	- `negative` — the state is a concrete gap the control would flag.
	506	- `informational` — the state is audit-trail/inventory that feeds a review but
	507	is not itself pass/fail. When in doubt, use `informational`.
	508	5. Decide detection-vs-finding. If the signal is a scanner/alert stream, you
	509	usually want two mapping kinds: a `status = NULL` row for "the control's
	510	tooling exists" (positive), and per-status rows for individual findings.
	511	Remember rule 3 in [How mapping works](#how-mapping-works-mechanically): both
	512	fire on the same snapshot.
	513	6. Pin the edition. State which version of the framework you mapped (e.g.
	514	"PCI DSS v4.0.1", "NIST CSF 2.0") — control numbers move between editions.
	515	7. Write the rationale in the `rationale` column and the fit assessment
	516	here. The `rationale` is what an auditor reads in the export; make it a
	517	complete thought, not a keyword.
	518
	519	### What the code needs
	520
	521	Three touchpoints, all small:
	522
	523	- `src/exporter.ts` — add the new value to the `Framework` type
	524	(`"soc2" \| "iso27001" \| ...`).
	525	- `src/index.ts` — add it to `normalizeFramework` so `?framework=` and the
	526	export form accept it.
	527	- `src/dashboard.ts` — add it to the framework selector if it should be
	528	user-selectable.
	529
	530	### Checklist for a new framework
	531
	532	- [ ] New migration `migrations/000N_<framework>_mappings.sql` inserting
	533	`control_mappings` rows with the new `framework` value.
	534	- [ ] Every mapping uses a `resource`/`status` the pipeline already produces (see
	535	[`extractFact`](../src/webhook.ts) and [`poller.ts`](../src/poller.ts)). If
	536	you need a signal that isn't collected yet, that is a collection change
	537	first — a mapping to a resource that is never written produces no evidence.
	538	- [ ] `rationale` on each row is a complete, auditor-readable sentence.
	539	- [ ] A new `### <Framework>` subsection here, or per-signal rows added to the
	540	existing sections, plus reference-table and glossary entries.
	541	- [ ] The framework edition/version is stated.
	542	- [ ] `Framework` type + `normalizeFramework` updated.
	543	- [ ] `npm run typecheck` passes; `npm run db:migrate:local` applies cleanly.
	544
	545	### Worked micro-example
	546
	547	To map branch protection to NIST CSF 2.0, whose `PR.PS-06` covers a secure
	548	software development lifecycle:
	549
	550	```sql
	551	INSERT INTO control_mappings (resource, status, framework, control_id, posture, rationale) VALUES
	552	('branch_protection', 'enabled', 'nistcsf', 'PR.PS-06', 'positive', 'SDLC change control — review required before merge to the default branch'),
	553	('branch_protection', 'disabled', 'nistcsf', 'PR.PS-06', 'negative', 'SDLC change-control gap — direct pushes to the default branch possible');
	554	```
	555
	556	Then add `"nistcsf"` to the `Framework` type and `normalizeFramework`, and add a
	557	`### NIST CSF 2.0` subsection here documenting the reasoning and fit.
	558
	559	---
	560
	561	## Keeping this document in sync
	562
	563	The mappings live in two places that must agree: the SQL seed rows in
	564	`migrations/` (the source of truth the engine reads) and the
	565	[reference table](#complete-mapping-reference) and per-signal sections here.
	566	When you change a mapping, change both in the same PR — the same discipline
	567	the README applies to retention periods. A mapping row with no rationale here, or
	568	a row here with no SQL, is a bug.
	569
	570	This is enforced. [`scripts/check-mappings.mjs`](../scripts/check-mappings.mjs)
	571	applies every migration to an in-memory SQLite database, reads back
	572	`control_mappings`, and diffs the `(resource, status, framework, control_id,
	573	posture)` tuples against the rows parsed out of the
	574	[reference table](#complete-mapping-reference) above. It fails with a row-level
	575	diff if the two drift. Run it with:
	576
	577	```sh
	578	npm run test:mappings
	579	```
	580
	581	It has no dependencies (Node's built-in `node:sqlite`) and is a good CI gate. It
	582	checks the reference table specifically — the per-signal tables and glossary
	583	are prose and are not parsed, so keep those consistent by hand.
	584
	585	---
	586
	587	## Sources
	588
	589	Control numbers and titles are cited from the published standards; exact
	590	criterion text is paraphrased (the standards themselves are copyrighted).
	591
	592	- ISO/IEC 27001:2022, Annex A — control titles confirmed via
	593	[ISMS.online, "ISO 27001:2022 Annex A Explained"](https://www.isms.online/iso-27001/annex-a-2022/).
	594	- AICPA Trust Services Criteria (TSP Section 100, 2017 criteria with 2022
	595	revised points of focus) — CC category scope confirmed via
	596	[Linford & Co., "Trust Services Criteria"](https://linfordco.com/blog/trust-services-critieria-principles-soc-2/)
	597	and [Secureframe, "SOC 2 Common Criteria"](https://secureframe.com/hub/soc-2/common-criteria).
	598	- The authoritative text for both is the source standard: purchase ISO/IEC
	599	27001:2022 from ISO, and the AICPA Trust Services Criteria from the AICPA.
	600	Verify any mapping against those before an audit.

migrations/0006_secret_scanning_cc6_1.sql added +12

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
	1	-- Secret scanning now maps to BOTH CC6.6 and CC6.1. A leaked credential is
	2	-- simultaneously an external-access vector (CC6.6 — protection against threats
	3	-- outside the system boundary, already mapped in 0002) and a compromise of the
	4	-- logical-access controls themselves (CC6.1 — logical access security over
	5	-- protected assets), since the credential is itself a logical-access key.
	6	-- Auditors differ on which is the primary home; attesting both lets the export
	7	-- satisfy whichever the control narrative uses. Each secret-scanning snapshot
	8	-- therefore emits the CC6.1 rows below in addition to its CC6.6 rows.
	9	INSERT INTO control_mappings (resource, status, framework, control_id, posture, rationale) VALUES
	10	('secret_scanning_alert', NULL, 'soc2', 'CC6.1', 'positive', 'Logical-access credential protection — leaked-credential detection is active'),
	11	('secret_scanning_alert', 'open', 'soc2', 'CC6.1', 'negative', 'Exposed credential undermines logical access controls'),
	12	('secret_scanning_alert', 'resolved', 'soc2', 'CC6.1', 'positive', 'Logical access control restored — exposure remediated');

migrations/0007_close_coverage_gaps.sql added +30

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
	1	-- Migration 0007: close the asymmetric-coverage gaps from the framework-mapping
	2	-- review. Three signals were mapped in only one framework although the
	3	-- equivalent control clearly exists in the other. See docs/framework-mapping.md.
	4	--
	5	-- 1. Dependabot -> ISO A.8.8 (Management of technical vulnerabilities). A.8.8 is
	6	-- one control covering the whole vulnerability lifecycle (identify -> evaluate
	7	-- -> remediate), so — unlike the SOC 2 split across CC7.1/CC7.2 — every status
	8	-- maps to this single control.
	9	-- 2. Code scanning -> SOC 2 CC7.1 (detection & monitoring), mirroring how
	10	-- Dependabot's tooling-active fact already maps to CC7.1. Only the tooling-
	11	-- active (NULL) row is added; finding-level rows are deliberately NOT routed
	12	-- to CC7.2 here, pending the CC7.1-vs-CC7.2 decision noted in the doc.
	13	-- 3. Secret scanning -> ISO A.5.17 (Authentication information). A leaked
	14	-- credential is exposed authentication information; mirrors the SOC 2
	15	-- CC6.6/CC6.1 rows into ISO.
	16	INSERT INTO control_mappings (resource, status, framework, control_id, posture, rationale) VALUES
	17	-- Dependabot: ISO technical-vulnerability management (full lifecycle, one control)
	18	('dependabot_alert', NULL, 'iso27001', 'A.8.8', 'positive', 'Technical vulnerability management — detection tooling is active'),
	19	('dependabot_alert', 'open', 'iso27001', 'A.8.8', 'negative', 'Unremediated known technical vulnerability'),
	20	('dependabot_alert', 'fixed', 'iso27001', 'A.8.8', 'positive', 'Vulnerability remediated'),
	21	('dependabot_alert', 'dismissed', 'iso27001', 'A.8.8', 'positive', 'Vulnerability remediated (risk accepted)'),
	22	('dependabot_alert', 'auto_dismissed', 'iso27001', 'A.8.8', 'positive', 'Vulnerability remediated (e.g. dependency removed)'),
	23
	24	-- Code scanning: SOC 2 detection tooling active (findings intentionally unmapped here)
	25	('code_scanning_alert', NULL, 'soc2', 'CC7.1', 'positive', 'Detection tooling is active — SAST runs in the development pipeline'),
	26
	27	-- Secret scanning: ISO authentication-information protection
	28	('secret_scanning_alert', NULL, 'iso27001', 'A.5.17', 'positive', 'Authentication information protection — leaked-credential detection is active'),
	29	('secret_scanning_alert', 'open', 'iso27001', 'A.5.17', 'negative', 'Exposed authentication information'),
	30	('secret_scanning_alert', 'resolved', 'iso27001', 'A.5.17', 'positive', 'Authentication information exposure remediated');

package.json +1

	@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
8	"deploy": "wrangler deploy",	8	"deploy": "wrangler deploy",
9	"types": "wrangler types",	9	"types": "wrangler types",
10	"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",	10	"typecheck": "tsc --noEmit",
		11	"test:mappings": "node scripts/check-mappings.mjs",
11	"db:migrate:local": "wrangler d1 migrations apply DB --local",	12	"db:migrate:local": "wrangler d1 migrations apply DB --local",
12	"db:migrate:remote": "wrangler d1 migrations apply DB --remote"	13	"db:migrate:remote": "wrangler d1 migrations apply DB --remote"
13	},	14	},

scripts/check-mappings.mjs added +89

@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
	1	// Sync check: assert that the control-framework mappings in migrations/ exactly
	2	// match the reference table in docs/framework-mapping.md. The migrations are the
	3	// source of truth the engine reads; the doc is the human-readable copy an auditor
	4	// relies on. If they drift, the doc is lying — so this fails CI.
	5	//
	6	// It works by actually applying every migration to an in-memory SQLite database
	7	// (so migration 0003's delete-and-reinsert is handled exactly as production D1
	8	// would), reading back control_mappings, and diffing against the rows parsed out
	9	// of the doc's "Complete mapping reference" table.
	10	//
	11	// Run: npm run test:mappings (no dependencies — uses Node's built-in sqlite)
	12
	13	import { DatabaseSync } from "node:sqlite";
	14	import { readFileSync, readdirSync } from "node:fs";
	15	import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
	16	import { dirname, join } from "node:path";
	17
	18	const repoRoot = join(dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), "..");
	19	const migrationsDir = join(repoRoot, "migrations");
	20	const docPath = join(repoRoot, "docs", "framework-mapping.md");
	21
	22	// A "·" in the doc's Status column means the mapping's status is NULL (matches
	23	// any status); normalize both sides to this sentinel so they compare equal.
	24	const NULL_STATUS = "·";
	25	const key = (resource, status, framework, control, posture) =>
	26	`${resource}\|${status ?? NULL_STATUS}\|${framework}\|${control}\|${posture}`;
	27
	28	// --- 1. Source of truth: apply migrations, read control_mappings. ---
	29	function rowsFromMigrations() {
	30	const db = new DatabaseSync(":memory:");
	31	const files = readdirSync(migrationsDir)
	32	.filter((f) => f.endsWith(".sql"))
	33	.sort();
	34	for (const file of files) {
	35	db.exec(readFileSync(join(migrationsDir, file), "utf8"));
	36	}
	37	const rows = db
	38	.prepare("SELECT resource, status, framework, control_id, posture FROM control_mappings")
	39	.all();
	40	db.close();
	41	return new Set(rows.map((r) => key(r.resource, r.status, r.framework, r.control_id, r.posture)));
	42	}
	43
	44	// --- 2. Human-readable copy: parse the doc's reference table. ---
	45	// Matches only rows of the reference table, which are shaped:
	46	// \| `resource` \| status \| SOC 2 \| CC8.1 \| positive \| rationale \|
	47	// The framework name in cell 3 and the bare posture word in cell 5 are what
	48	// distinguish these from the per-section tables (framework-first, prose posture)
	49	// and the glossary (bolded control in cell 1), so those are not matched.
	50	const FRAMEWORK_LABELS = { "SOC 2": "soc2", "ISO 27001": "iso27001" };
	51	const ROW_RE =
	52	/^\\|\s`([^`]+)`\s\\|\s(.+?)\s\\|\s(SOC 2\|ISO 27001)\s\\|\s([\w.]+)\s\\|\s(positive\|negative\|informational)\s\\|/;
	53
	54	function rowsFromDoc() {
	55	const set = new Set();
	56	for (const line of readFileSync(docPath, "utf8").split("\n")) {
	57	const m = ROW_RE.exec(line);
	58	if (!m) continue;
	59	const [, resource, statusCell, frameworkLabel, control, posture] = m;
	60	const status = statusCell.replace(/`/g, "").trim(); // already "·" for NULL
	61	set.add(key(resource, status, FRAMEWORK_LABELS[frameworkLabel], control, posture));
	62	}
	63	return set;
	64	}
	65
	66	// --- 3. Diff. ---
	67	const db = rowsFromMigrations();
	68	const doc = rowsFromDoc();
	69
	70	const onlyInDb = [...db].filter((k) => !doc.has(k)).sort();
	71	const onlyInDoc = [...doc].filter((k) => !db.has(k)).sort();
	72
	73	if (onlyInDb.length === 0 && onlyInDoc.length === 0) {
	74	console.log(`✓ mappings in sync: ${db.size} rows match between migrations/ and docs/framework-mapping.md`);
	75	process.exit(0);
	76	}
	77
	78	console.error("✗ control-mapping drift between migrations/ and docs/framework-mapping.md\n");
	79	console.error(" columns: resource \| status \| framework \| control \| posture\n");
	80	if (onlyInDb.length) {
	81	console.error(` In migrations but MISSING from the doc (${onlyInDb.length}):`);
	82	for (const k of onlyInDb) console.error(` + ${k}`);
	83	}
	84	if (onlyInDoc.length) {
	85	console.error(` In the doc but MISSING from migrations (${onlyInDoc.length}):`);
	86	for (const k of onlyInDoc) console.error(` - ${k}`);
	87	}
	88	console.error("\n Fix: update whichever is wrong so migrations/ and the doc's reference table agree.");
	89	process.exit(1);

Commit e87add187b

Commit `e87add187b`