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cmc <hello@cleberg.net> · 2026-02-22 03:32 UTC
committer: <noreply@github.com>

publish new post: auditing-aws-passwords (#10)

* clean up latest post for ease of reading

* publish new post: auditing-aws-passwords

Layout: unified · split

content/blog/2026-02-21-auditing-aws-iam.org +106 −132

		@@ -1,44 +1,50 @@
1	1	#+date: [2026-02-21 Sat 18:58:39]
2	2	#+title: Auditing AWS IAM Identity Center Assignments
3		#+description: How to audit IAM Identity Center access assignments in AWS using a shell script, including what to look for, common exceptions, and how to write up findings.
	3	#+description: Learn how to audit IAM user assignments in AWS.
4	4	#+slug: auditing-aws-iam
5	5
6	6	If you've ever asked an IT team for a list of who has access to an AWS account,
7	7	you've probably received a spreadsheet that was already out of date. Or worse,
8		an out-of-context screenshot that doesn't explain anything. IAM Identity Center
9		doesn't make this easy to extract through the console, and most teams don't have
10		a repeatable process for pulling it. This post walks through a script that does
11		it for you and explains what to look for once you have the output.
	8	an out-of-context screenshot that doesn't explain anything. Or worse, they don't
	9	know either and ignore you, hoping you forget about the request (ask me how I
	10	know!).
	11
	12	To make it worse, IAM Identity Center doesn't make this easy to extract through
	13	the console, and most teams don't have a repeatable process for pulling it.
	14
	15	To solve this problem, this post walks through a script that does it for you and
	16	explains what to look for once you have the output. This is something I've used
	17	in practice and want to share, as cloud auditing knowledge seems scarce.
12	18
13	19	The script is available at [[https://github.com/audit-labs/audit-tools/blob/main/applications/aws/aws_iam_users.sh][audit-labs/audit-tools]].
14	20
15	21	* Background: How AWS Provisions Access
16	22
17	23	Before running anything, it helps to understand the different ways AWS can be
18		architected to grant access. You may encounter any of these in practice,
19		sometimes within the same organization, and knowing how they differ tells you
20		where to look during an audit and which questions to ask.
	24	architected to grant access. You may encounter any one (or all) of these in
	25	practice, sometimes within the same organization. Knowing how they differ tells
	26	you where to look during an audit and which questions to ask.
21	27
22		** Traditional IAM Users
	28	** IAM Users
23	29
24		The original AWS access model. An IAM user is an identity created directly
25		inside a single AWS account. It has a username, optional console password, and
	30	This is the original AWS access model. An IAM user is an identity created
	31	directly inside a single AWS account (e.g., ~iamuser1~ created inside AWS user
	32	~cmc~). This type of account has a username, an optional console password, and
26	33	optional access keys for programmatic access. Permissions are granted by
27	34	attaching IAM policies directly to the user, or by adding the user to an IAM
28	35	group that has policies attached to it.
29	36
30		You'll still see IAM users in older environments, smaller organizations, and in
31		cases where a service or application needs long-lived programmatic credentials.
32	37	The core problem with IAM users at scale is that they're account-scoped, meaning
33	38	a user in ~Account A~ has no relationship to a user in ~Account B~, even if they're
34	39	the same person. Organizations with dozens or hundreds of accounts end up with a
35	40	fragmented identity landscape that's difficult to review and even harder to
36	41	deprovision consistently.
37	42
38		From an audit perspective, IAM users are high-risk when they have active access
39		keys (long-lived credentials that don't expire unless explicitly rotated or
40		revoked) or when policies are attached directly to the user rather than
41		inherited through a group.
	43	From an audit perspective, these are key risks to understand during your
	44	walkthrough of the environment. Additionally, you should note that IAM users are
	45	high-risk when they have active access keys (long-lived credentials that don't
	46	expire unless explicitly rotated or revoked) or when policies are attached
	47	directly to the user rather than inherited through a group.
42	48
43	49	** IAM Groups
44	50
		@@ -86,30 +92,31 @@ Policies are the documents that define permissions. They're not an access
86	92	pattern on their own, but understanding the three types helps when reviewing
87	93	output from any access audit:
88	94
89		- AWS managed policies are created and maintained by AWS. Examples include
90		~AdministratorAccess~, ~ReadOnlyAccess~, and job-function policies like ~Billing~.
91		They're convenient but broad: ~AdministratorAccess~ is a single policy that
92		grants full access to every AWS service.
93		- Customer managed policies are created by the organization. They offer more
94		precise control and can be reused across users, groups, and roles. Better
95		practice than relying entirely on AWS managed policies for anything sensitive.
96		- Inline policies are embedded directly into a specific user, group, or role
97		rather than existing as a standalone resource. They can't be reused and are
98		easier to miss during reviews. When you see an inline policy in audit output,
99		treat it as something that warrants a closer look — they're often added ad hoc
100		to solve a specific problem and not always well documented.
	95	1. AWS managed policies are created and maintained by AWS. Examples include
	96	~AdministratorAccess~, ~ReadOnlyAccess~, and job-function policies like ~Billing~.
	97	They're convenient but broad: ~AdministratorAccess~ is a single policy that
	98	grants full access to every AWS service.
	99	2. Customer managed policies are created by the organization. They offer more
	100	precise control and can be reused across users, groups, and roles. Better
	101	practice than relying entirely on AWS managed policies for anything
	102	sensitive.
	103	3. Inline policies are embedded directly into a specific user, group, or role
	104	rather than existing as a standalone resource. They can't be reused and are
	105	easier to miss during reviews. When you see an inline policy in audit output,
	106	treat it as something that warrants a closer look — they're often added ad
	107	hoc to solve a specific problem and not always well documented.
101	108
102	109	** IAM Identity Center
103	110
104	111	IAM Identity Center (formerly AWS SSO) is the current recommended approach for
105		human access in multi-account AWS Organizations. It sits above individual
106		accounts and provides centralized access management across all of them from a
107		single place.
	112	human (end-user) access in multi-account AWS Organizations. It sits above
	113	individual accounts and provides centralized access management across all of
	114	them from a single place.
108	115
109	116	It connects to an identity source, such as AWS's own directory, Active
110		Directory, or an external IdP like Okta or Entra ID, and uses that as the source
111		of truth for users and groups. Access is configured within Identity Center
112		itself, not inside individual accounts.
	117	Directory, or an externali identity provider (IdP) like Okta or Entra ID, and
	118	uses that as the source of truth for users and groups. Access is configured
	119	within Identity Center itself, not inside individual accounts.
113	120
114	121	The key construct is the permission set: a named bundle of IAM policies
115	122	(managed, customer managed, and/or inline) that defines what a principal can do.
		@@ -135,32 +142,35 @@ why.
135	142
136	143	* What the Script Does
137	144
138		The script works against a single named AWS account and produces a JSON report
139		of every user and group assignment, along with the permission set and policies
140		attached to each assignment.
	145	The script works by running commands against a single named AWS account and
	146	produces a JSON report of every user and group assignment, along with the
	147	permission set and policies attached to each assignment.
141	148
142	149	It runs in four steps:
143	150
144	151	1. Finds the IAM Identity Center instance and looks up the target account ID by
145		name
146		2. Lists all permission sets provisioned to that account
	152	name;
	153	2. Lists all permission sets provisioned to that account;
147	154	3. For each permission set, retrieves all user and group assignments, resolves
148	155	their names from the Identity Store, and fetches the managed and inline
149		policies attached to the permission set
150		4. Writes everything to a JSON file named ~report_<account_name>.json~
	156	policies attached to the permission set;
	157	4. Writes everything to a JSON file named ~report_<account_name>.json~.
151	158
152	159	The script caches permission set details and principal names to avoid redundant
153	160	API calls when the same permission set or user appears in multiple assignments.
154	161
	162	At the end of this process, we will have the evidence we need to test controls
	163	such as administrative access or segregation of duties.
	164
155	165	* Prerequisites
156	166
157	167	You'll need:
158	168
159		- AWS CLI installed and configured with credentials that have read access to
160		~sso-admin~, ~identitystore~, and ~organizations~
161		- ~jq~ installed (used throughout the script for JSON parsing)
	169	- AWS CLI (or AWS CloudShell) installed and configured with credentials that
	170	have read access to ~sso-admin~, ~identitystore~, and ~organizations~;
	171	- ~jq~ installed (used throughout the script for JSON parsing);
162	172	- The name of the AWS account you want to audit (must match exactly as it
163		appears in AWS Organizations)
	173	appears in AWS Organizations).
164	174
165	175	Set the account name at the top of the script before running:
166	176
		@@ -179,32 +189,6 @@ chmod +x aws_iam_users.sh
179	189	#+attr_html: :alt Terminal output of aws_iam_users.sh showing discovered assignments for the cmc account.
180	190	[[https://img.cleberg.net/blog/20260221-auditing-aws-iam/script.webp]]
181	191
182
183		* Key Snippet: Resolving Principal Names
184
185		The part of the script most worth understanding is how it resolves user and
186		group names. AWS stores principals in Identity Center by ID, not by name. To get
187		a readable name, the script calls the Identity Store API separately for each
188		principal:
189
190		#+begin_src bash
191		if [ "$PRINCIPAL_TYPE" == "USER" ]; then
192		PRINCIPAL_NAME=$(aws identitystore describe-user \
193		--identity-store-id "$IDENTITY_STORE_ID" \
194		--user-id "$PRINCIPAL_ID" \
195		--query "UserName" --output text 2>/dev/null)
196		elif [ "$PRINCIPAL_TYPE" == "GROUP" ]; then
197		PRINCIPAL_NAME=$(aws identitystore describe-group \
198		--identity-store-id "$IDENTITY_STORE_ID" \
199		--group-id "$PRINCIPAL_ID" \
200		--query "DisplayName" --output text 2>/dev/null)
201		fi
202		#+end_src
203
204		This is also where the cache matters. If the same user appears across multiple
205		permission set assignments (which is common), the script reuses the stored name
206		rather than making a redundant API call.
207
208	192	* Reading the Output
209	193
210	194	The script produces a JSON array where each element represents a single
		@@ -266,74 +250,64 @@ principal-to-permission-set assignment. Here's an example:
266	250
267	251	A few things to look for when reviewing this output:
268	252
269		Direct user assignments: ~iamtestuser1~ is assigned ~AdministratorAccess~ directly
270		as a USER, not through a group. Access should generally be provisioned through
271		groups so that provisioning and deprovisioning are tied to group membership, not
272		managed case-by-case. A direct user assignment to a high-privilege permission
273		set warrants a conversation with IT about why it exists.
274
275		AdministratorAccess: This is AWS's broadest managed policy, which allows full
276		access to everything in the account. Note who has it and whether that's
277		appropriate. In many environments, even senior engineers shouldn't have standing
278		~AdministratorAccess~; it should be reserved for break-glass accounts or
279		infrastructure teams with a documented need.
280
281		Inline policies: The ~inline_policy~ field in this example contains a Deny
282		statement for ~a4b:*~ (Alexa for Business). Inline policies attached to permission
283		sets are worth reviewing, as they can add permissions or restrict them, and
284		they're easy to miss if you're only looking at the managed policy name.
285
286		Multiple assignments for the same user: ~iamtestuser1~ appears twice: once with
287		~AdministratorAccess~ and once with ~Billing~. This isn't automatically a problem,
288		but a user with both full administrative access and explicit billing access is
289		worth confirming with IT.
	253	- Direct user assignments: ~iamtestuser1~ is assigned ~AdministratorAccess~ directly
	254	as a USER, not through a group. Access should generally be provisioned through
	255	groups so that provisioning and deprovisioning are tied to group membership,
	256	not managed case-by-case. A direct user assignment to a high-privilege
	257	permission set warrants a conversation with IT about why it exists.
	258	- AdministratorAccess: This is AWS's broadest managed policy, which allows full
	259	access to everything in the account. Note who has it and whether that's
	260	appropriate. In many environments, even senior engineers shouldn't have
	261	standing ~AdministratorAccess~. It should be reserved for break-glass accounts
	262	or infrastructure teams with a documented need.
	263	- Inline policies: The ~inline_policy~ field in this example contains a Deny
	264	statement for ~a4b:*~. Inline policies attached to permission sets are worth
	265	reviewing, as they can add permissions or restrict them, and they're easy to
	266	miss if you're only looking at the managed policy name.
	267	- Multiple assignments for the same user: ~iamtestuser1~ appears twice: once with
	268	~AdministratorAccess~ and once with ~Billing~. This isn't automatically a problem,
	269	but a user with both full administrative access and explicit billing access is
	270	worth confirming with IT.
290	271
291	272	* Common Exceptions and False Positives
292	273
293		Break-glass accounts: Most organizations maintain at least one emergency account
294		with direct ~AdministratorAccess~ that bypasses normal access controls. A direct
295		USER assignment to ~AdministratorAccess~ may be intentional for this reason. Ask
296		IT whether a break-glass account exists, confirm the username matches, and
297		document it as an accepted exception if appropriate.
298
299		Small organizations or early-stage environments: Some teams haven't implemented
300		group-based access management yet and assign permissions directly to users
301		across the board. This isn't a false positive, it's a control gap, but the
302		finding should reflect the scale and maturity of the environment. A two-person
303		startup with direct assignments is a different risk than an enterprise doing the
304		same thing.
305
306		Service or automation accounts: Occasionally a USER principal in Identity Center
307		is a service account rather than a human. These may legitimately have specific
308		permission sets assigned directly. Confirm the account's purpose before writing
309		it up.
	274	- Break-glass accounts: Most organizations maintain at least one emergency
	275	account with direct ~AdministratorAccess~ that bypasses normal access controls.
	276	A direct USER assignment to ~AdministratorAccess~ may be intentional for this
	277	reason. Ask IT whether a break-glass account exists, confirm the username
	278	matches, and document it as an accepted exception if appropriate.
	279	- Small organizations or early-stage environments: Some teams haven't
	280	implemented group-based access management yet and assign permissions directly
	281	to users across the board. This is a control gap, but the finding should
	282	reflect the scale and maturity of the environment. A two-person startup with
	283	direct assignments is a different risk than an enterprise doing the same
	284	thing. This may or may not give rise to a deficiency.
	285	- Service or automation accounts: Occasionally a ~USER~ principal in Identity
	286	Center is a service account rather than a human. These may legitimately have
	287	specific permission sets assigned directly. Confirm the account's purpose
	288	before writing it up.
310	289
311	290	* How to Write Up the Finding
312	291
313	292	If you identify a direct high-privilege user assignment that isn't a documented
314	293	exception, here's how to frame it:
315
316		Condition: User ~iamtestuser1~ is directly assigned the ~AdministratorAccess~
317		permission set in account ~cmc~, rather than receiving access through a group
318		assignment.
319
320		Criteria: Access to AWS accounts via IAM Identity Center should be provisioned
321		through groups to ensure consistent access management. Direct user assignments
322		bypass group-based controls and are not subject to standard group membership
323		reviews.
324
325		Risk: Direct user assignments increase the likelihood of orphaned access
326		following role changes or departures. They are also harder to identify during
327		periodic access reviews, as reviewers may focus on group membership rather than
328		individual assignments.
329
330		Evidence: Attach the relevant portion of ~report_cmc.json~ filtered to show the
331		specific principal, permission set, and policies. The JSON output is
332		self-documenting, as it includes the account name in the filename and contains
333		the full policy details alongside the assignment.
334
335		To filter the output to just the direct user assignments for the evidence
336		attachment:
	294	- Deficiency: User ~iamtestuser1~ is directly assigned the ~AdministratorAccess~
	295	permission set in account ~cmc~, rather than receiving access through a group
	296	assignment.
	297	- Root Cause: Due to {{ root cuase }}, the user ~iamtestuser1~ was inappropriately
	298	provisioned the ~AdministratorAccess~ permission directly rather than through a
	299	group assignment.
	300	- Risk: Direct user assignments increase the likelihood of orphaned access
	301	following role changes or departures. They are also harder to identify during
	302	periodic access reviews, as reviewers may focus on group membership rather
	303	than individual assignments.
	304	- Evidence: Attach the relevant portion of ~report_cmc.json~ filtered to show the
	305	specific principal, permission set, and policies. The JSON output is
	306	self-documenting, as it includes the account name in the filename and contains
	307	the full policy details alongside the assignment.
	308
	309	If requested during review, you can filter the output to just the direct user
	310	assignments:
337	311
338	312	#+begin_src bash
339	313	jq '[.[] \| select(.principal.type == "USER")]' report_cmc.json

content/blog/2026-02-21-auditing-aws-passwords.org added +212

		@@ -0,0 +1,212 @@
	1	#+date: [2026-02-21 Sat 21:13:45]
	2	#+title: Auditind AWS Passwords
	3	#+description: Learn how to audit passwords in AWS.
	4	#+slug: auditing-aws-passwords
	5
	6	One of the first controls an IT Auditor learns is how to audit passwords in any
	7	number of IT systems. However, things have changed with the introduction of
	8	cloud platforms. This post covers the process and results of auditing AWS
	9	passwords.
	10
	11	The scripts are available at [[https://github.com/audit-labs/audit-tools/tree/main/applications/aws/aws_password_policy][audit-labs/audit-tools]].
	12
	13	* Scoping
	14
	15	First thing's first: scoping. To audit AWS passwords, we need to understand that
	16	AWS IAM password policies only apply to users with console access. This isn't
	17	the same as the password policy for an application built on top of AWS. It also
	18	has no effect on users who authenticate through IAM Identity Center, which
	19	delegates authentication to an external identity provider, such as Okta or
	20	Active Directory.
	21
	22	If the organization uses Identity Center exclusively and has no IAM users with
	23	passwords, you will need to perform a different procedure.
	24
	25	If they do have IAM users with console access, the script applies and is worth
	26	testing.
	27
	28	* What the Scripts Do
	29
	30	The process runs in two steps:
	31	1. ~gather_policy.sh~ calls the AWS CLI to fetch the current IAM password policy,
	32	captures metadata (timestamp, AWS account, region, caller identity), and writes
	33	everything to a JSON file. This file is evidence of the policy's current state.
	34	2. ~evaluate_policy.py~ reads that JSON file, prompts you for the expected value of
	35	each setting, and exports a CSV report with a value of ~PASS~ or ~FAIL~ for each
	36	rule.
	37
	38	* Prerequisites
	39
	40	To run this script, you'll need:
	41
	42	- Access to CloudShell or the AWS CLI utility installed and configured with
	43	credentials that have read access to ~iam:GetAccountPasswordPolicy~ and
	44	~sts:GetCallerIdentity~
	45	- ~jq~ installed (used by the Bash script to merge JSON objects)
	46	- Python 3 installed
	47	- Optional: ~uv~ installed (used to run the Python script)
	48
	49	* Step 1: Gather the Policy
	50
	51	Run the first script to pull the current policy from AWS:
	52
	53	#+begin_src bash
	54	chmod +x gather_policy.sh
	55	./gather_policy.sh
	56	#+end_src
	57
	58	By default, this writes the output to ~policy_report.json~ in the current
	59	directory. You can specify a custom path with the ~-o~ flag:
	60
	61	#+begin_src bash
	62	./gather_policy.sh -o /tmp/my_report.json
	63	#+end_src
	64
	65	The output is a JSON file with two top-level keys: ~metadata~ and ~PasswordPolicy~.
	66
	67	#+begin_src json
	68	{
	69	"metadata": {
	70	"report_timestamp_utc": "2025-12-15T01:29:52Z",
	71	"os_user": "cloudshell-user",
	72	"hostname": "",
	73	"working_directory": "/home/cloudshell-user",
	74	"aws_profile": "default",
	75	"aws_region": "eu-west-1",
	76	"aws_caller_identity": {
	77	"UserId": "214941490075",
	78	"Account": "214941490075",
	79	"Arn": "arn:aws:iam::214941490075:root"
	80	}
	81	},
	82	"PasswordPolicy": {
	83	"MinimumPasswordLength": 8,
	84	"RequireSymbols": true,
	85	"RequireNumbers": true,
	86	"RequireUppercaseCharacters": true,
	87	"RequireLowercaseCharacters": true,
	88	"AllowUsersToChangePassword": true,
	89	"ExpirePasswords": true,
	90	"MaxPasswordAge": 90,
	91	"PasswordReusePrevention": 4,
	92	"HardExpiry": false
	93	}
	94	}
	95	#+end_src
	96
	97	The metadata block is what ties this evidence to a specific account and point in
	98	time. The ~aws_caller_identity~ field shows who ran the script and in which
	99	account.
	100
	101	* Step 2: Evaluate the Policy
	102
	103	Pass the JSON file to the evaluation script:
	104
	105	#+begin_src bash
	106	uv run evaluate_policy.py policy_report.json
	107	#+end_src
	108
	109	The script will prompt you for each of the ten settings. Press ~Enter~ to skip any
	110	setting you don't need to test. For numeric settings like ~MinimumPasswordLength~
	111	and ~MaxPasswordAge~, the script treats your input as a minimum, so the actual
	112	value must be greater than or equal to your expected value to pass. Boolean
	113	settings require an exact match.
	114
	115	#+begin_src text
	116	=== Expected / Minimum Values (press <Enter> for N/A) ===
	117
	118	Enter expected value for 'Minimum password length' (int) or press <Enter> to skip: 8
	119	Enter expected value for 'Require symbols (!@#$...)' (bool) or press <Enter> to skip: true
	120	Enter expected value for 'Require numbers (0-9)' (bool) or press <Enter> to skip: true
	121	Enter expected value for 'Require uppercase letters (A-Z)' (bool) or press <Enter> to skip: true
	122	Enter expected value for 'Require lowercase letters (a-z)' (bool) or press <Enter> to skip: true
	123	Enter expected value for 'Allow users to change password' (bool) or press <Enter> to skip: true
	124	Enter expected value for 'Expire passwords (enable aging)' (bool) or press <Enter> to skip: true
	125	Enter expected value for 'Maximum password age (days)' (int) or press <Enter> to skip: 90
	126	Enter expected value for 'Prevent password reuse (last N)' (int) or press <Enter> to skip: 4
	127	Enter expected value for 'Hard expiry (no grace period)' (bool) or press <Enter> to skip: false
	128
	129	Audit CSV written to: policy_audit_20251215T014323Z.csv
	130
	131	Summary:
	132	1. Minimum password length -> PASS
	133	2. Require symbols (!@#$...) -> PASS
	134	3. Require numbers (0-9) -> PASS
	135	4. Require uppercase letters (A-Z) -> PASS
	136	5. Require lowercase letters (a-z) -> PASS
	137	6. Allow users to change password -> PASS
	138	7. Expire passwords (enable aging) -> PASS
	139	8. Maximum password age (days) -> PASS
	140	9. Prevent password reuse (last N) -> PASS
	141	10. Hard expiry (no grace period) -> PASS
	142
	143	--- End of report ---
	144	#+end_src
	145
	146	* Reading the CSV
	147
	148	The CSV is your evidence. It includes the metadata header from the JSON file, so
	149	the account ID, timestamp, and caller identity are embedded directly in the
	150	file.
	151
	152	#+begin_src csv
	153	# report_timestamp_utc: 2025-12-15T01:29:52Z
	154	# os_user: cloudshell-user
	155	# hostname:
	156	# working_directory: /home/cloudshell-user
	157	# aws_profile: default
	158	# aws_region: eu-west-1
	159	# aws_caller_identity: {'UserId': '214941490075', 'Account': '214941490075', 'Arn': 'arn:aws:iam::214941490075:root'}
	160
	161	Rule#,Policy-Item,Expected,Actual,Result
	162	1,Minimum password length,8,8,PASS
	163	2,Require symbols (!@#$...),true,true,PASS
	164	3,Require numbers (0-9),true,true,PASS
	165	4,Require uppercase letters (A-Z),true,true,PASS
	166	5,Require lowercase letters (a-z),true,true,PASS
	167	6,Allow users to change password,true,true,PASS
	168	7,Expire passwords (enable aging),true,true,PASS
	169	8,Maximum password age (days),90,90,PASS
	170	9,Prevent password reuse (last N),4,4,PASS
	171	10,Hard expiry (no grace period),false,false,PASS
	172	#+end_src
	173
	174	You may use this evidence in any form, but I suggest having your AWS contact
	175	screenshot the results directly within their CloudShell or AWS CLI session. This
	176	allows you to prove that the data was not modified after the script was run.
	177
	178	* Common Exceptions and False Positives
	179
	180	- No policy defined: If ~gather_policy.sh~ exits with a ~NoSuchEntity~ error, the
	181	account has no IAM password policy configured. If you were expecting a password
	182	policy, document it as a missing control.
	183	- HardExpiry: false: This setting controls whether users are locked out
	184	immediately when their password expires or given a grace period to change it.
	185	~false~ is often intentional to avoid lockouts. Check the organization's policy
	186	before calling it a finding. Additionally, check if the organization has
	187	security exceptions in place before noting a deficiency.
	188	- MaxPasswordAge and forced rotation: A 90-day rotation requirement is common in
	189	older policies and frameworks like CIS. NIST 800-63B no longer recommends forced
	190	rotation unless there's evidence of compromise. Know which framework you're
	191	auditing against before writing up a finding for this setting. Confirm with the
	192	organization to understand which framework they used to write their policy.
	193	- PasswordReusePrevention: AWS allows a maximum of 24 previous passwords. If your
	194	organization's policy requires a higher number than AWS supports, document the
	195	platform limitation rather than raising it as a deficiency.
	196
	197	* How to Write Up the Finding
	198
	199	If a setting fails, here's how to frame it:
	200	- Deficiency: The ~MinimumPasswordLength~ setting in the AWS IAM password policy is
	201	configured to ~6~, which is below the organization's requirement of ~8~ characters.
	202	- Root Cause: Due to {{ root cause }}, the policy was configured to enforce a
	203	~MinimumPasswordLength~ of ~6~.
	204	- Risk: Shorter passwords are more susceptible to brute-force and credential
	205	stuffing attacks, increasing the likelihood of unauthorized access to the AWS
	206	console.
	207	- Evidence: Refer to ~policy_audit_<timestamp>.csv~ for documentation of testing.
	208
	209	The same structure applies to any other failing rule. For boolean settings, the
	210	deficiency is simply that the actual value does not match the expected value.
	211	For numeric settings, the deficiency is that the actual value falls below the
	212	required minimum.

Commit 8386d675f5

Commit `8386d675f5`