e2e/audit_test.go
117 lines · 4942 bytes
1package e2e
2
3import (
4 "crypto/rand"
5 "os"
6 "path/filepath"
7 "strings"
8 "testing"
9)
10
11func TestAuditAndHardening(t *testing.T) {
12 t.Parallel()
13 inst := startInstanceWith(t, "[limits]\nssh_auth_rate = 3\nmax_pack_bytes = 2000\n")
14 adminKey := inst.newKey(t, "root")
15 aliceKey := inst.newKey(t, "alice")
16 bobKey := inst.newKey(t, "bob")
17 inst.admin(t, "admin", "user", "create", "root", "--key", adminKey+".pub", "--admin")
18 inst.admin(t, "admin", "user", "create", "alice", "--key", aliceKey+".pub")
19 inst.admin(t, "admin", "user", "create", "bob", "--key", bobKey+".pub")
20
21 // Mutating commands land in the audit log with source fingerprints;
22 // reads do not. Admin-only over SSH; host admin command works too.
23 if _, _, code := inst.ssh(t, aliceKey, "", "repo", "create", "alice/app"); code != 0 {
24 t.Fatal("repo create failed")
25 }
26 if _, _, code := inst.ssh(t, aliceKey, "", "repo", "access", "grant", "alice/app", "bob", "write"); code != 0 {
27 t.Fatal("grant failed")
28 }
29 if _, _, code := inst.ssh(t, aliceKey, "", "repo", "list"); code != 0 {
30 t.Fatal("repo list failed")
31 }
32 if _, _, code := inst.ssh(t, aliceKey, "", "audit"); code != 4 {
33 t.Fatal("non-admin read the audit log")
34 }
35 out, _, code := inst.ssh(t, adminKey, "", "audit", "--json")
36 if code != 0 || !strings.Contains(out, "cmd repo create") ||
37 !strings.Contains(out, "cmd repo access grant") ||
38 !strings.Contains(out, `SHA256:`) || // key fingerprint as source
39 !strings.Contains(out, "admin user.created") {
40 t.Fatalf("audit content: %s", out)
41 }
42 if strings.Contains(out, "cmd repo list") {
43 t.Fatal("read-only command audited")
44 }
45 if out := inst.admin(t, "admin", "audit", "--limit", "5"); !strings.Contains(out, "cmd repo") {
46 t.Fatalf("host audit: %s", out)
47 }
48
49 // Prose reaches argv through --title and --body. The entry records
50 // that the flags were given, not what was written: the issue itself is
51 // the record of its own text, and the audit log is not pruned by
52 // default (#122).
53 if _, errOut, code := inst.ssh(t, aliceKey, "", "issue", "create", "alice/app",
54 "--title", "'a short title'", "--body", "'prose that must not be copied'"); code != 0 {
55 t.Fatalf("issue create: %s", errOut)
56 }
57 out, _, code = inst.ssh(t, adminKey, "", "audit", "--json")
58 if code != 0 || !strings.Contains(out, "cmd issue create") {
59 t.Fatalf("issue create not audited: %s", out)
60 }
61 if strings.Contains(out, "prose that must not be copied") || strings.Contains(out, "a short title") {
62 t.Fatalf("audit log copied the issue text:\n%s", out)
63 }
64 if !strings.Contains(out, "--body") || !strings.Contains(out, "alice/app") {
65 t.Fatalf("audit log dropped the flag names or the target:\n%s", out)
66 }
67
68 // Disable: everything refused, sessions dropped, nothing deleted.
69 inst.admin(t, "admin", "user", "disable", "bob")
70 if _, errOut, code := inst.ssh(t, bobKey, "", "whoami"); code != 4 || !strings.Contains(errOut, "disabled") {
71 t.Fatalf("disabled ssh: exit %d, %s", code, errOut)
72 }
73 inst.admin(t, "admin", "user", "enable", "bob")
74 if _, _, code := inst.ssh(t, bobKey, "", "whoami"); code != 0 {
75 t.Fatal("re-enabled user still refused")
76 }
77
78 // max_pack_bytes: an oversized push is refused by receive-pack.
79 work := t.TempDir()
80 env := inst.gitEnv(aliceKey)
81 mustGit(t, work, env, "clone", inst.sshURL("alice/app"), "w")
82 dir := filepath.Join(work, "w")
83 big := make([]byte, 200_000)
84 rand.Read(big) // incompressible: the pack must exceed max_pack_bytes
85 os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "big.bin"), big, 0o644)
86 mustGit(t, dir, env, "checkout", "-q", "-b", "main")
87 mustGit(t, dir, env, "add", ".")
88 mustGit(t, dir, env, "commit", "-q", "-m", "big")
89 if out, code := gitRun(t, dir, env, "push", "origin", "main"); code == 0 || !strings.Contains(out, "max") {
90 t.Fatalf("oversized push accepted: exit %d\n%s", code, out)
91 }
92 // A normal-sized push still works.
93 mustGit(t, dir, env, "rm", "-q", "big.bin")
94 os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(dir, "small.txt"), []byte("ok\n"), 0o644)
95 mustGit(t, dir, env, "add", ".")
96 mustGit(t, dir, env, "commit", "-q", "--amend", "-m", "small")
97 mustGit(t, dir, env, "push", "-q", "origin", "main")
98
99 // Auth rate limit, LAST because it locks out this whole IP: a burst
100 // of unknown-key failures throttles further auth — even a valid key
101 // — until the window passes. (Registration is closed, so unknown
102 // keys fail auth.) The audit is read host-locally: SSH is locked.
103 strangerKey := inst.newKey(t, "stranger")
104 for i := 0; i < 5; i++ {
105 inst.ssh(t, strangerKey, "", "whoami")
106 }
107 if _, _, code := inst.ssh(t, adminKey, "", "whoami"); code == 0 {
108 t.Fatal("valid key not throttled after failure burst")
109 }
110 auditOut := inst.admin(t, "admin", "audit")
111 if !strings.Contains(auditOut, "auth.failed") || !strings.Contains(auditOut, "auth.throttled") {
112 t.Fatalf("burst not audited:\n%s", auditOut)
113 }
114 if strings.Count(auditOut, "auth.throttled") != 1 {
115 t.Fatal("throttle audited more than once per window")
116 }
117}